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Abstract
In this commentary, I will consider the implications of the argument made by
Christopher Stratman (2020) in ‘Ectogestation and the Problem of Abortion’.
Clearly, the possibility of ectogestation will have some effect on the ethical debate
on abortion. However, I have become increasingly sceptical that the possibility of
ectogestation will transform the problem of abortion. Here, I outline some of my
reasons to justify this scepticism. First, I argue that virtually everything we already
know about unintended pregnancies, abortion and adoption does not prima facie
support the assumption that a large shift to ectogestation would occur. Moreover,
if ectogestation does not lead to significant restrictions to abortion, then there will
be no radical transformation of the practice of abortion. Second, abortion is
already associated with stigma, and so the presence of ectogestation would need
to create additional stigma to modify behaviour. Finally, I argue that ectogestation
shifts the debate away from the foetus to the human subject of the artificial
womb—the gestateling, therefore creating a new category of killing—gestaticide.
However, this would only reorient the debate rather than end it.
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1 Introduction
Christopher Stratman (2020) defends the claim that there is no right to the death of the
foetus when ectogestation is possible, even if they lack the moral status of a person.
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This is a conclusion I have argued for previously (Blackshaw and Rodger 2019) in
response to those who have argued to the contrary (Räsänen 2017).1 Though there are
many arguments against the claim that there is a right to the death of the foetus, it seems
unlikely that the possibility of ectogestation will radically transform the abortion
debate—especially that it will cause a reduction in the incidence of abortion.
Here, I briefly outline some challenges against Stratman's (2020) claim that the
possibility of ectogestation—a period of gestation in an artificial ex utero
environment—will radically transform the problem of abortion. First, I argue that virtually
everything we already know about unintended pregnancies, abortion and adoption seems
to suggest that a large shift to ectogestation is unlikely to occur. Moreover, if ectogestation
does not lead to significant legal restrictions on abortion, then there is unlikely to be any
radical transformation on the practice of abortion. Second, abortion is already associated
with stigma, and so the presence of ectogestation would need to increase the existing
stigma to modify behaviour away from abortion. Finally, I argue that artificial womb
technology shifts the debate away from the foetus to the human subject of the artificial
womb—what Elizabeth Chloe Romanis (2018) has termed the gestateling. It creates a new
category of killing—gestaticide—which will more closely resemble the ethical debate
around infanticide rather than abortion (Rodger et al. 2020).
2 Adoption, Harm and Stigma
Women who have an unintended pregnancy can already entrust the moral and legal
responsibilities of parenthood to a competent individual or couple—via adoption. In
many ways, ectogestation allows for the same opportunities as adoption. In both cases,
the resulting gestatelings’ or neonates’ needs are met by something or someone else.
Moreover, both provide a means for continued human existence, in contrast with
induced abortion. One obvious difference is that in the case of ectogestation, the period
of gestation would be less than completing a normal pregnancy (e.g. perhaps they could
be transferred to an artificial womb at 24 weeks); otherwise, there would be little reason
to opt for ectogestation over adoption in the case of an unintended pregnancy.
Women with an unintended pregnancy are the group most likely to have an abortion,
with 61% of unintended pregnancies between 2015 and 2019 ending in abortion
(Bearak et al. 2020); globally, 25% of pregnancies end in abortion (Sedgh et al.
2016). Therefore, ectogestation would need to be employed very early on in the
pregnancy—because women who would otherwise seek an abortion will likely not
want to be delayed in relieving the burdens they perceive or associate with their
pregnancy. In most high-income countries, at least 90% of induced abortions are
completed before the 13th week of pregnancy (Popinchalk and Sedgh 2019). Most
women who consider abortion do not choose to complete the pregnancy and give their
child up for adoption (Sisson et al. 2017). Unless it is medically indicated, women do
not and are not legally permitted to request to deliver their foetus prematurely at the
point of viability (24–28 weeks) with the intent that the child receive neonatal intensive
care under the responsibility of adoptive parents. If ectogestation is to function as an
alternative to abortion, this is what women would be expected to do. However, based
1 As have many others, see Mathison and Davis (2017), Hendricks (2018), and Kaczor (2018).
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on what is already known about women who consider and procure abortions,
ectogestation would need to be available at a much earlier stage of pregnancy than
the point of viability.2
The reasons for not opting for foetal transfer surgery, ectogestation and adoption are
likely to be similar or the same as those given for not completing the pregnancy and
giving the child up for adoption. In fact, there are additional reasons for women to
object to this process—the need for invasive surgery to transfer the foetus into an
artificial womb despite the fact that abortion obtained early in pregnancy is relatively
safe for women (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2019).
The invasive surgery required for a foetal transfer is likely to be analogous to the
surgery required for a caesarean section, and therefore, the risks involved will be
closely aligned. Given that the vast majority of induced abortions occur before the
13th week of pregnancy, the overall risks (e.g. rates of serious complications) are likely
to be lower—where abortion is legal—than those that would be associated with foetal
transfer surgery, if they reflect the risks associated with caesarean section.3 This in itself
is not an argument for abortion; otherwise, the increased complication risks associated
with naturally giving birth compared with early abortion could be used to argue that
abortion would be clinically indicated for all pregnancies.4 This point merely shows
that the increased risks that would be associated with foetal transfer surgery, when
compared with the comparatively lower risks of early induced abortion, are likely to
reinforce the decision to opt for abortion and not ectogestation.
In a study of women in the USA who had abortions, the reason they gave for not
giving their child up for adoption was that giving up one’s child was considered
morally unconscionable (Finer et al. 2005). This is congruent with the existing research
that explores women’s views of ectogestation compared with abortion (Cannold 1995;
Simonstein and Mashiach-Eizenberg 2009). In a qualitative study by Leslie Cannold
(1995, p.60), adoption (and ectogestation) was understood by some women as an
‘irresponsible abdication...of their maternal responsibilities’. Furthermore, the use of
ectogestation for resolving an unintended pregnancy was viewed negatively by women
irrespective of their views on abortion, even when ectogestation was described as no
more medically risky or inconvenient than abortion (Cannold 1995). This means that
even if there is no right to the death of the foetus, the possibility of ectogestation is
unlikely to affect women’s decision-making if adoption is perceived as being psycho-
logically distressing (Jones et al. 2008).
The primary reason that we would expect women to opt for ectogestation would be if
legal restrictions were implemented against abortion based on the presence of artificial
womb technologies. This is of course theoretically possible but improbable—especially
in countries where legal abortion is not connected to foetal viability. It would require a
significant shift in the current cultural and international trajectory of abortion legislation.
This trajectory is evidenced by the trend towards decriminalising abortion, most recently
in Northern Ireland in 2019 (Aiken and Bloomer 2019), and expanding the legally
permitted grounds for abortion (Guillaume and Rossier 2018). In other words,
2 Realistically, ectogestation would need to be available prior to 13 weeks to act as an alternative to abortion.
3 For a discussion of a similar point and an argument for why ectogestation should not be considered as an
alternative to pregnancy or abortion, see Romanis et al. (2020).
4 For a discussion of this point, see Blackshaw and Rodger (2020).
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international trends appear to be moving towards broadening abortion access, not
restricting it in ways that would be required were ectogestation to become available.
A central question, therefore, is this: if—many or most—women who are consider-
ing abortion tend to pursue abortion rather than adoption today, what reason do we
have to think this will change when ectogestation becomes a reality?
First, given the additional risks that are posed—however small—there does not seem
to be any obvious reason why women who would consider abortion would opt for
ectogestation when they so rarely choose to complete gestation (or at least wait until
viability) and then give their child up for adoption. In fact, not only are there risks
posed by surgery, but presumably there would also be some risk to the foetus from the
transfer to the artificial womb, risks that are likely to outweigh those it would be
exposed to if the pregnancy was left uninterrupted. Ectogestation, if completed around
the time that most abortions are completed, would entail that women with an unin-
tended pregnancy are spared the responsibilities and challenges of an extended period
of pregnancy, but if one intends to give one’s child up for adoption—for the child’s
long-term benefit—then why not opt for completing the pregnancy without all of the
additional risks? The artificial womb technology being developed is aimed primarily at
reducing neonatal mortality caused by premature birth (Partridge et al. 2017) and would
likely be utilised by women experiencing a pregnancy that poses a risk to their own
health (Romanis et al. 2020). It is not being developed as an alternative to abortion as
the technology is not expected to be within the purview of early pregnancy. If
ectogestation entails a risk to the mothers’ health and an additional risk to the
gestatelings’ health and adoption is viewed by women considering abortion as psy-
chologically harmful and morally irresponsible, then ectogestation is unlikely to radi-
cally transform the problem of abortion.
Second, one must consider the potential social changes that the possibility of
ectogestation could bring about. Artificial gestation compared with natural gestation
would be visible—gestation becomes observable in a way that was only possible
infrequently under ultrasound. This is not beyond the realms of possibility as the
Biobag used to gestate lamb foetuses for up to 28 days by Partridge et al. (2017) was
transparent and therefore observable throughout the process. Artificial gestation could
become something of a spectacle that can be enjoyed by the parent/s, family, friends
and the community. It may also have the effect of humanising the subject of
ectogestation—the gestateling—and creating increased stigmatisation of induced abor-
tion. It is possible that ectogestation will cause an increase in stigma that could
discourage some women from obtaining an abortion. However, given the risks in-
volved with ectogestation outlined above, an increase in stigma towards abortion may
lead to an uptake in adoption without the use of ectogestation. Moreover, stigma
against abortion already exists (Cárdenas et al. 2018; Biggs et al. 2020), and adoption
is already an option. Ectogestation, therefore, would have to create additional stigma to
have any real effect on the incidence of induced abortion.
3 Problems That Must Be Overcome
The problems I have outlined are not insurmountable. It could be the case that
ectogestation can one day start safely from the first trimester of pregnancy; there are
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hundreds of thousands of individuals or couples willing to adopt; foetal transfer surgery
turns out to be low risk and without much inconvenience; restrictions to legal abortion
are implemented in several countries; and there is both the technological and medical
capacities to support hundreds of thousands of gestatelings each year. On balance, I
think each of the scenarios I have described is unlikely to materialise to the scale
required to radically transform the problem of abortion.
4 A New Problem: Gestaticide
A further issue raised by transferring pregnanciesto an artificial womb is that it
means creating a new category of killing—gestaticide (Rodger et al. 2020). Gestaticide
describes the deliberate killing of the subject of an artificial womb. It has long been the
case that some philosophers have argued that infanticide is morally permissible, and
arguments that justify infanticide are likely to also apply to the gestateling. As both are
independent of the mother, the case for infanticide and gestaticide must be made on
grounds other than bodily autonomy. Peter Singer (2011) has argued that because
infants lack characteristics such as rationality, autonomy and self-awareness, then
killing them cannot be considered the moral equivalent of killing a human that does
possess these characteristics. On such accounts the newborn, like the foetus—and
gestateling—should not be understood as persons with a corresponding right to life.5
Therefore, fewer reasons would be needed to justify killing them compared to an
individual who possesses the characteristics necessary to have a right to life. Similar
arguments have been put forward by other philosophers such as Michael Tooley
(1983), Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel (2008), and Alberto Giubilini and Francesca
Minerva (2013).6 So, even if we accept that there is no right to the death of the foetus—
whilst in utero—this may only result in a new ethical debate surrounding the permis-
sibility of gestaticide—which will conceptually resemble the ethical debate surrounding
the permissibility of infanticide rather than abortion.
5 Conclusion
In summary, I have argued that even if ectogestation becomes possible, this is unlikely
to transform the abortion debate. Unless the presence of ectogestation is conjoined with
significant abortion restrictions, women are unlikely to opt for ectogestation for the
same or similar reasons that they rarely opt to give their child up for adoption.
Moreover, the additional stigma created by not using ectogestation is unlikely to be
significant enough to modify behaviour to the extent required to transform the problem
of abortion. Finally, assuming women were to transfer their unintended pregnancies to
an artificial womb for ectogestation, this would simply generate debate concerning a
new category of killing—gestaticide. Rather than ending the debate around abortion, it
5 For a discussion of moral status and the relevance of birth, see Colgrove (2019); Romanis (2019); and
Colgrove (2020).
6 More recently defended by Räsänen (2016).
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may only reorient it to whether—or when—it is permissible to kill humans undergoing
artificial gestation.
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